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2022.08.14

米国 国土安全保障省 監察官室 国土安全保障省は偽情報キャンペーンに対する統一的な戦略が必要

こんにちは、丸山満彦です。

国土安全保障省の監察官室(内部監査部門)は、「国土安全保障省は偽情報キャンペーンに対する統一的な戦略が必要」という勧告を出していますね。。。

米国連邦政府ですら、そういう戦略がないということですから、他の国でも同様なのでしょうね(中国はあるかもしれませんが。。。)。

 

Oversight.GOV

・2022.08.10 DHS Needs a Unified Strategy to Counter Disinformation Campaigns

DHS Needs a Unified Strategy to Counter Disinformation Campaigns 国土安全保障省は偽情報キャンペーンに対する統一的な戦略が必要
Report Description:  報告書の内容 
The objective was to determine the extent to which DHS is positioned to prevent and reduce domestic terrorism in the United States. We determined that DHS has taken steps to help the United States counter terrorism, but those efforts have not always been consistent. This occurred because the Department has not established a governance body with staff dedicated to long-term oversight and coordination of its efforts to combat domestic terrorism. 目的は、国土安全保障省が米国の国内テロを防止・軽減するためにどの程度まで位置づけられているかを判断することであった。我々は、国土安是保障省が米国のテロ対策を支援するための措置を講じていると判断したが、その努力は必ずしも一貫していない。これは、同省が国内テロ対策への取り組みを長期的に監督・調整するための専門スタッフを擁する統治機関を設立していないために生じたものである。

 

・[PDF] OIG-22-58-Aug22.pdf

20220814-61105

 

ハイライト...

Why We Did This Audit   監査を実施した理由  
In recent years, cyberattacks, intellectual property theft, and statesponsored disinformation campaigns against our Nation have increased significantly. Our objective was to determine the internal and external coordination efforts the Department has taken to counter disinformation that appears in social media.  近年、わが国に対するサイバー攻撃、知的財産の窃盗、国家主導の偽情報キャンペーンが著しく増加している。我々の目的は、ソーシャルメディアに現れる偽情報に対抗するために、同省が行ってきた内部および外部の調整努力を明らかにすることである。 
What We Recommend   勧告事項  
We recommend DHS develop a unified strategy to counter disinformation campaigns that appear in social media.  国土安全保障省がソーシャルメディアに現れる偽情報キャンペーンに対抗する統一戦略を策定することを勧告する。 
What We Found   発見事項  
The Department of Homeland Security began internal and external coordination efforts in 2018 to counter disinformation appearing in social media. These efforts were predominantly focused on disinformation campaigns that pertained to election infrastructure or to distinct mission operations.  国土安全保障省は2018年、ソーシャルメディアに現れる偽情報に対抗するため、内部および外部の調整努力を開始した。これらの取り組みは、主に選挙インフラに関連する偽情報キャンペーンや、明確な任務遂行に焦点を当てたものであった。 
Although DHS components have worked across various social media platforms to counter disinformation, DHS does not yet have a unified department-wide strategy to effectively counter disinformation that originates from both foreign and domestic sources. DHS faced challenges unifying component efforts because disinformation is an emerging and evolving threat. We also attributed some challenges to the continual changes in DHS leadership, which may have hindered the development of top-down strategic guidance for countering disinformation.  国土安全保障省の各部門は、さまざまなソーシャルメディア・プラットフォームで偽情報対策に取り組んできたが、国土安全保障省には、海外と国内の両方から発信される偽情報に効果的に対抗するための部門全体の統一戦略はまだない。偽情報が新たな脅威であり、進化しているため、国土安全保障省は各部門の取り組みを統一するという課題に直面している。また、国土安全保障省の指導者が絶えず交代していることも、情報操作に対抗するためのトップダウンの戦略的指針の策定を妨げている可能性があると考えられる。 
Without a unified strategy, DHS and its components cannot coordinate effectively, internally, or externally to counter disinformation campaigns that appear in social media.  統一された戦略がなければ、国土安全保障省とその構成機関は、ソーシャルメディアに現れる偽情報キャンペーンに対抗するために、内部でも外部でも効果的に調整することができない。 
DHS Response  国土安全保障省の対応 
The Department concurred with our recommendation. DHS management comments on a draft of this report are in Appendix A.  同省は我々の勧告に同意した。本報告書の草稿に対する 国土安全保障省の執行陣のコメントは附属書 A にある。

 

・[DOCX] 仮訳

 

参考文献が役に立つことも多いので、、、

  1. DHS, Strategic Planning, last updated November 10, 2021, https://www.dhs.gov/strategicplanning.

  2. DHS, Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure, last updated February 23, 2022, https://www.dhs.gov/secure-cyberspace-and-critical-infrastructure.

  3. Pew Research Center, 7 Percent of Americans don't use the internet. Who are they?, April 2, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/02/7-of-americans-dont-use-theinternet-who-are-they/.

  4. CISA defines disinformation as fabricated information intended to mislead or cause harm; misinformation is false, but not created or shared with the intention of causing harm; and malinformation is based on fact but used out of context to mislead, harm, or manipulate, https://www.cisa.gov/mdm.

  5. CISA Insights, Preparing for and Mitigating Foreign Influence Operations Targeting Critical Infrastructure, February 2022, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa_insight_mitigating_foreign_influenc pdf.

  6. AEP 2019, Combatting Targeted Disinformation Campaigns, October 2019 https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ia/ia_combatting-targeteddisinformation-campaigns.pdf.

  7. Merriam Webster defines a deepfake as an image or recording that has been convincingly altered and manipulated to misrepresent someone as doing or saying something that was not actually done or said, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deepfake. According to the Regulatory Review, Responding to Deepfakes and Disinformation, August 14, 2021, deepfakes are uniquely effective at spreading disinformation, https://www.theregreview.org/2021/08/14/saturday-seminar-responding-deepfakesdisinformation/.

  8. Kelley M. Sayler and Laurie A. Harris, Deepfakes and National Security, June 8, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11333.

  9. Forbes, There Are Now 15,000 Deepfake Videos on Social Media. Yes, You Should Worry, October 8, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbbrandon/2019/10/08/there-are-now15000-deepfake-videos-on-social-media-yes-you-should-worry/?sh=75405acd3750.

  10. Katell Thielemann, It’s Time to Focus on Critical Infrastructure Systems Security, January 24, 2022, https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/critical-infrastructure-security/617561/.

  11. Senate Letter to DHS Regarding Efforts to Prevent Disinformation & Propaganda, March 13, 2022, https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/3290%20FINAL.pdf.

  12. CISA Alert (AA20-352A), Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations, April 15, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-352a.

  13. Gillian Cleary, Twitter Bots: Anatomy of a Propaganda Campaign, June 5, 2019, https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/twitterbotspropaganda-disinformation.

  14. AEP 2019, Combatting Targeted Disinformation Campaigns, October 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ia/ia_combatting-targeteddisinformation-campaigns.pdf.

  15. WTOP, COVID Conspiracy: Foreign Disinformation Driving American Vaccine Resistance, September 27, 2021, https://wtop.com/j-j-green-national/2021/09/covid-conspiracy-foreigndisinformation-driving-american-vaccine-resistance/.

  16. PEW, Election Disinformation Fears Came True for State Officials, November 20, 2020, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/11/20/electiondisinformation-fears-came-true-for-state-officials.

  17. Christina Georgapoulos and Trey Poche, Fake news, disinformation and the George Floyd Protests, August 2020, https://faculty.lsu.edu/fakenews/about/protestfakenews.php.

  18. Brookings, How Disinformation Evolved in 2020, January 4, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-disinformation-evolved-in-2020/.

  19. Id.

  20. Presidential Policy Directive 41, United States Cyber Incident Coordination, July 26, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/26/presidential-policydirective-united-states-cyber-incident.

  21. CISA’s MDM website, accessed July 13, 2021, states it continues to make social media platforms and law enforcement aware of disinformation, https://www.cisa.gov/mdm.

  22. CISA’s email correspondence to Social Media platforms included the following disclaimer: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies. CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms.  CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.”  

  23. Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence,

  24. CISA’s Bug Bytes graphic novel, accessed April 29, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/resilienceseries-graphic-novels.

  25. CISA’s Real Fake graphic novel, accessed April 29, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/resilienceseries-graphic-novels.

  26. CISA, #Protect2020 webpage, accessed April 29, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/protect2020.

  27. CISA, Tools of Disinformation: Inauthentic Content, accessed April 29, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mdm-inauthentic-content-productpdf.

  28. CISA’s factsheet states that forged artifacts typically feature fake letterheads, copied and pasted signatures, made-up social media posts, and maliciously edited emails. Proxy websites are fronts for malicious actors, designed to launder disinformation and divisive content or use that content to drive website visits, accessed May 11, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mdm-inauthentic-content-productpdf.

  29. COVID-19 Disinformation Toolkit, accessed April 29, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/covid-19disinformation-toolkit.

  30. Social Media Bots Infographic Set, accessed May 11, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/social_media_bots_infographic_set_508.

  31. Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, February 12, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidentialpolicy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.

  32. DHS Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, September 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0920_plcy_strategic-frameworkcountering-terrorism-targeted-violence.pdf.

  33. Homeland Threat Assessment, October 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_homeland-threatpdf.

  34. Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, September 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0920_plcy_strategic-frameworkcountering-terrorism-targeted-violence.pdf.

  35. Alejandro Mayorkas was sworn in as DHS Secretary on February 1, 2021.

  36. In an April 2022 House Judiciary Committee hearing, the DHS Secretary stated that the Department had established a Disinformation Governance Board to focus on the dissemination of disinformation. Three weeks after DHS Secretary’s announcement, it was reported that the Department decided to “pause” the Disinformation Governance Board and its work. We did not validate detailed information about the board, a strategy, or milestones as part of this audit, as it was formed after our fieldwork was complete. Washington Post, How the Biden administration let right-wing attacks derail its disinformation efforts, May 18, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/05/18/disinformation-board-dhs-ninajankowicz/.


 

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