MITRE "Intelligence After Next"

こんにちは、丸山満彦です。

国のインテリジェンスをどうすべきかという課題提起の文書なんですかね。。。

インテリジェンス機能を持つ組織ってどの国も複数あって、お互いの連携がどれほどできているのかはよくわからないですね。。。3.11で明らかになり、その後改善されているのだろうが・・・

２月末現在で５つ公表されていますね。。。

● MITRE

・Intelligen after next

＃	Title	タイトル
5	MISSION-BASED CHALLENGES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY	インテリジェンス・コミュニティのミッションベースの課題
4	BUILDING A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYTIC CADRE	防諜分析幹部の構築
3	DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION – A MISSION IMPERATIVE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY	多様性と統合 - インテリジェンス・コミュニティにとって不可欠な使命
2	RADICAL TRANSPARENCY IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	インテリジェンス運用のための根本的な透明性
1	THE FUTURE OF THE IC WORKPLACE	インテリジェンス・コミュニティ・ワークプレイスの未来

#	Issue	Title	Summary
5	2021.02.16	MISSION-BASED CHALLENGES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY	Former Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats in the 2019 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), wrote “we have to become much more agile, more innovative, more creative.” Given the dynamic nature of demands on the Intelligence Community (IC) and the rapid pace of emerging technology, it is hard to disagree with Director Coats’ statement. At the same time, it is hard to look at the IC one year later and see real movement toward this goal or impact from the 2019 NIS.  One could argue that it is not only the 2019 NIS that has failed in this way, but that the halls, safes, and hard drives of the National Capital Region are littered with failed strategies and initiatives to increase innovation or drive development of the favored technology of the day to support national security. For every document which has had lasting impact in shifting the focus of the problem set the IC addresses—there are dozens of others that have come and gone with no lasting and real impact. As an alternative approach, this document proposes five mission-based challenges for the IC to take on in the next 3-5 years.  They include: Countering adversary malign influence campaigns before they broadly impact our population. Mitigating insider threats rapidly and effectively through detection and protection. Enabling free flow of information and communication in ‘smart’ cities under authoritarian governments with exquisite surveillance capabilities. Finding peer high value relocatable targets (HVRTs) within the window when they are exposed for critical operations, thereby enabling traditional kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against them. Providing greater non-traditional and non-kinetic means for disabling critical targets. Identifying measures of success and accompanying metrics for each of these will be key to achieving measurable progress in facing these challenges. Solving them, however, will not solve every problem the IC confronts today. No set of 5, 15, or even 50 challenges could do that. However, if the IC can solve even 2 or 3 of these challenges, it will have enhanced its impact while exercising its ability to identify the right emerging technologies needed for these specific challenges and the ability to adopt and adapt those technologies as needed for its problem set. Those behaviors will be critical enablers for addressing the other pressing problems the IC faces.
4	2021.02.05	BUILDING A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYTIC CADRE	The introduction of advanced cyber techniques, persistent, ubiquitous surveillance and advanced self- learning penetration technologies leveraging artificial intelligence has significantly altered and accelerated the counterintelligence (CI)  threat landscape. To address this new threat landscape, a counterintelligence analysis cadre should be established to integrate the full range of counterintelligence disciplines to effectively monitor, assess, and share foreign CI threat information. This includes traditional counterintelligence disciplines such as cyber, technical and security analysis, as well as a deeper focus on economic espionage and foreign influence. The counterintelligence community must adapt now to effectively respond to these complex threats. The congressionally-mandated formation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) after the 9/11 attacks serves as a useful model for the counterintelligence community. Creating a cross-agency counterintelligence counterpart to the NCTC—with the authorities and capabilities to integrate and analyze all foreign counterintelligence threat information—will significantly improve the Intelligence Community’s (IC’s) ability to meet the counterintelligence challenges now and into the future.
3	2021.01.25	DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION – A MISSION IMPERATIVE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY	The U.S. faces a future in which domestic and global demographics will rapidly shift and starkly contrast the current demographics. To remain effective in producing high quality intelligence, the Intelligence Community (IC) must comprehensively understand and correctly assess the dynamic environment in which the U.S. operates. This requires building and leveraging teams comprised of experts from socially and culturally diverse backgrounds to maximize analytic value. Yet, despite a variety of diversity and inclusion initiatives, IC workforce diversity changes have been modest. Women, minorities, and people with disabilities remain underrepresented throughout the workforce, with the most extreme disparities in leadership positions. By sustaining a workforce that is disproportionately white and male, the IC misses important mission benefits derived from diversity, as data consistently show that organizations with diverse staff and leadership outperform their more homogeneous counterparts. The IC’s ongoing diversity and inclusion efforts will be most successful when they are widely accepted and understood as mission essential and the IC workforce itself is both driving the demand and shaping strategies for more diversity and inclusion. Given changing domestic demographics, it will become increasingly difficult to build and maintain a healthy long-term IC workforce without building a lasting culture of diversity and inclusion. The IC can accelerate its efforts by: Building recognition among IC staff that diversity and inclusion are essential to producing high-quality intelligence. If cultural blind spots and implicit biases are treated as natural, albeit dangerous, occurrences and are openly addressed, diversity and inclusion efforts can be seen as helpful enhancements to team effectiveness. Diversity and inclusion efforts must be recognized by the entire IC workforce as authentic and necessary, rather than abstract hiring mandates.  Sustaining and expanding programs that increase voluntary engagement aimed at achieving mission success through diversity and inclusion; promote intergroup contacts; and promote leadership engagement and accountability.  Expanding the collection of diversity and inclusion metrics to include more detailed data, such as diversity by mission area, disaggregation of gender data by race, and cultural competencies. Developing new strategies based on this data, detailed barrier and implementation analyses, and recently released research on effective methods for achieving a diverse and inclusive workforce.
2	2021.01.14	RADICAL TRANSPARENCY IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	Over the last decade, news organizations and citizen journalists using new technologies and data sources—including social media posts, commercial satellite imagery, and the digital exhaust of smart phones—have changed the definition of what is possible in uncovering malign activity by nation states and other actors. The powerful capability to observe and expose, previously centralized in state intelligence organizations, is now in the hands of citizens. These efforts change the behavior of global powers using an approach that the Intelligence Community (IC) doesn’t normally employ: radical transparency. The IC has traditionally worked opaquely within secure compartmented information facilities (SCIF) using classified data sources not accessible to the general public. With the rise of publicly available information (PAI) and the democratization of commercial sensor capabilities, the IC risks being outpaced by commercial companies, non-governmental organizations, and other nation-states if it continues to operate only behind closed doors in disconnected environments. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic is forcing the IC to rethink its approach and the spaces where it works, providing the community a unique opportunity to reframe its paradigms of classification, intelligence analysis, and information sharing. The IC can and should move beyond its myopic concern of exposing “sources and methods” and embrace radical transparency to help secure the global community. An open and non-traditional, partner-centric approach to intelligence will improve the scope and impact of the effects the U.S. is able to achieve against malign actors. Radical transparency in intelligence analysis would also be a visible and undeniable step toward collective global security and the rule of international law. The trust it would engender can be a key differentiator between America and other global powers.
1	2020.11.01	THE FUTURE OF THE IC WORKPLACE	Various pre-COVID-19 publications have forwarded suggestions for considering some degree of telework in the Inteligence Community (IC). Here, we dive deeper, providing a holistic view of the IC’s interoperability challenges and a roadmap for success. Two major benefits from this shift are achieving 21ST century operational resiliency and growing and sustaining the trusted workforce. The IC must evolve to operate a secure infrastructure outside of sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs). With the proper mechanisms in place, many job functions can be done in an unclassified environment. The need for operational resiliency mandates the IC pursue a flexible workplace, recruitment, and retention model across its entire workforce to ensure mission continuity and staff health. The failure to aggressively pursue a more robust, resilient, and flexible workplace environment will result in a serious degradation in the viability of the IC. By affording a new generation of intelligence professionals with the most capable tools, resources and workplace options, the IC will be able to compete for the best talent available.